Abstract · In addressing the question "Do representations need reality?", this paper attempts to show that a principled understanding of representations requires that they have objective, systematic content. It is claimed that there is an interesting form of nonconceptual, inten t ionality which is processed by non-systematic connectionist networks and has its correctness conditions provided by a modest biosemantics; but this type of content is not properly representational. Finally, I consider the consequences that such a verdict has on eliminativist views that look to connectionism as a means of radically reconceiving our understanding of cognition.
A good place to begin when addressing this question is by reminding ourselves of what representations are. In doing so we must be alive to Wittgenstein's warning.
In philosophy we are… in danger of producing a myth of symbolism, or a myth of mental processes (Wittgenstein 1967, § 211). In particular, the risk of reification and philosophical confusion is particularly rife with respect to theories of representation. When speaking loosely, it is frequent that the term representation is used equivocally. Minimally, it does double duty for both the vehicles of content and the representational contents. Of course, "the name 'representation' does not come from scripture." (Millikan 1993, p. 103) . But it is this kind of equivication that encourages confusion.
There no great danger in reifying the representational vehicles other than the risk of confusing dynamical systems of processing with static ones (Clark 1993b, p. 62) . But reifying representational contents, which the vehicles are supposed to carry, fosters folly. Representational contents are not things of any kind. On the traditional account, they describe one of two possible kinds of relation, true or false, between a vehicle of content and that which it 'represents'. Recognising this is important because most theories of representation define them such that it would be senseless to speak of representations without reference to the features or objects of which they serve to represent. This is a residual effect of modelling representations in terms of the kind of explicit, conscious representations we use, say, when finding our way to a friend's house. Such directions incorporate descriptions of features or objects of a particular environment which we can recognise and respond to under those descriptions by a series of rules telling us what to do when we encounter them. Familiarly, such directions might be: 'Turn left at Bridge Street, go straight until you reach the red post box, then turn right on the High Street' and so on.
Nor is this practice a foolish one. It gives a genuine sense to the term. It is only that if we push this line too strongly then we are apt to overlook a whole series of interesting, psychologically relevant phenomena, which are, in an important sense, not properly representations of, what we would designate as, objective features of a mind-independent reality. For example, if one considers the now common distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual content it is clearly the case that, the former but not the latter, must be understood with reference to mind-independent objects that are publicly identifiable. The real question is then: Does cognition need representations?
Two Types of Content
Cussins formally defined the difference between conceptual and nonconceptual content in the following way: (1) Conceptual properties are those cannonically characterized by means of concepts that a creature must possess for that property to be applicable to it.
(2) Nonconceptual properties are those cannonically characterised in terms of concepts which a creature need not possess for the property to apply. We can see the distinction clearly by considering a frequently cited perceptual case. The Müller-Lyer illusion provides a context in which we see one thing but believe another. That is to say we know the lines are the same length, but even so one line still appears longer to us. This is illustrated by figure 1.
The point is that a propositional content, like that of the belief 'The lines are the same length', is best defined in terms of concepts (or on a more realistic construal: composed of them). In contrast, the purely perceptual response is distinguished by the fact that those same concepts would be inappropriate if used in a principled statement of the content. Millikan uses an example, which will be directly relevant later, concerning the content of a frog's perceptual 'representation' to make exactly this point. She writes: "What a frog's eye tells a frog's brain may not imply any definite English sentence or sentences, but English sentences can be constructed that will imply the truth of what any particular frog's eye is currently telling its brain" (Millikan 1993, p. 119) .
Nevertheless, even in cases of nonconceptual content it would appear that things, features and situations are presented as being a certain way. Hence, even if we agree that the purely perceptual response is nonconceptual it can still be regarded as having content. For this reason, many philosophers commonly suggest that although such content is, by definition, lacking in concepts it is nonetheless basically representational in character. For example, Bermúdez writes:
Conceptual and nonconceptual content are distinguished not by whether they are representational, but according to how they represent (Bermúdez 1995, p. 335) . 1 But, it is also standardly supposed that to have any kind of content at all it is necessary that there are specifiable 'correctness conditions'. In Crane's words:
To say that any state has content is just to say that it represents the world as being a certain way. It thus has what Peacocke… calls a 'correctness condition'-the condition under which it represents correctly (Crane 1992, p. 139 , emphasis mine).
I will return to the issue of why we should be cautious with talk of representations in this domain and the kind of 'correctness conditions' which are appropriate to nonconceptual contents in the next section. 2 For the moment, I want to focus on the idea that nonconceptual contents differ from conceptual contents in a way that may not be immediately obvious from the fact that they do not 'represent' via a conceptual medium. That is to say, the most basic form of nonconceptual content does not map onto what we would recognise as 'objective features' of the world. Strictly speaking, although such contents might be crucially involved in guiding and controlling action, it would be a mistake to think that they are systematically representative of the objects and features of an external reality.
Objective and Non-Objective Thought
Nonconceptual content can be usefully illuminated by the work of Evans (1982) and Strawson (1959) . By resurrecting their work, Cussins (1990) and Chrisley (1993) remind us of the important distinction between objective and pre-objective modes of thought. Chrisley writes:
truly objective thought is manifested in the possession and maintenance of a unified conceptual framework within which the subject can locate, and thus relate to any other arbitrary object of thought, the bit of the world thought about… Pre-objective representation involves contents that present the world, but not as the world, not as something that is or can be independent of the subject (Chrisley 1993, p. 331) . 1 Elsewhere he writes: "mental states that represent the world but that do not require the bearer of those mental states to possess the concepts required to specify the way in which they represent the world" (Bermúdez 1994, p. 403, emphasis mine) . 2 Bermúdez confirms this by saying "Conceptual and nonconceptual content are both forms of content because there is a single notion of representation applicable to both" (Bermúdez 1995, p. 346) .
Pre-objective thought can be illustrated with reference to the responses of infants before they have achieved the stage of recognising object permanence (Chrisley 1993, p. 331) . In particular, infants lack the ability to think of objects as existing unperceived and hence, they clearly lack a conceptual capacity to represent objects qua objects in our sense. Chrisley goes on to explicitly connect this mode of non-objective responding with a lack of systematicity. He writes:
an infant which cannot…think of a particular object (a glass, say) as existing unseen, but it can represent its mother as being behind, out of view (on the basis of hearing her voice or feeling her arm, say). The contents of such an infant will violate the Generality Constraint, since the infant may be able to think (something like) glass in front of me and mother behind me but not glass behind me . (Chrisley 1993, p. 332) .
A crucial feature of non-objective modes of thought is that they lack the kind of systematicity that is a hallmark of logico-linguistic thought. Agents that only have a capacity for non-objective thought will not be able to make the kinds of systematic, formal substitutions that are characteristic of conceptual thought. It has been supposed by some that such substitutions, which provide a basis for compositionality, inference making, and productivity, are indeed a 'pervasive' criterion of cognition. 3 The thought is that if an organism can think of some object, x, that it has a property, Fx, then it must also have the ability to think of some other object that it could have that property as well (e.g. Fy). The same applies to relational forms, such that if a system can represent aRb, then it must also be capable of representing bRa. This is a consequence of the fact that traditional views of cognitive processing focus on systems whose transactions are made over atomic structures by means of logical rules.
Such substitutions are not possible in the domain of non-objective thought because the vehicles of such thought is not atomistic. This can be seen most clearly by considering that connectionist networks operate with distributed, context-sensitive vehicles. This is commonly illustrated with reference to Smolensky's example of the coffee cup through which he provides an intuitive understanding of, what I will call, fused representations. Thus, to borrow from Cussins, coffee-in-a-cup, coffee-spilt-onthe-table, coffee-in-the-form-of-granules-in-ajar, are all treated as wholly distinct; having no structural components in common. In other words, "the object/property decomposition is not built-in" (Chrisley 1993, p. 344) . The same goes for the subject-predicate dichotomy. To see how such structures are deployed in connectionist networks:
Just consider a network that is simultaneously learning two routes that happen to intersect at a few points. There is nothing that necessitates that the network use the same code for the place in both contexts; as a matter of fact, it might facilitate learning the sequences to have the representations distinct. (Chrisley 1993 , p. 346, cf. Cussins 1990 .
It is worth emphasising that the lack of a capacity for systematic, objective 'representation' does not necessarily impair an organism's capacity for sophisticated and co-ordinated action. We can see this by considering connectionist navigational networks which manage to get about quite well despite lacking a capacity for such representation. Nevertheless, it might be wondered just how sophisticated an organism's responses to an environment can be if its only vehicles of content are connectionist. To what extent we can rely on connectionism, and its attendant nonconceptual content, to explain cognition before we have to upgrade to a more traditional account?
It may be, as Millikan claims that "Preverbal humans, indeed, any animal that collects practical knowledge over time of how to relate to specific stuffs, individuals, and real kinds must have concepts of them." (Millikan 1998, p. 56, emphasis mine) . What it the force of this must? Millikan claims that such know-how amounts to mining the 'rich inductive potential' of certain relatively stable, re-identifiable environmental items is in effect making generalizations about these items. Hence, a creature that can reidentify a mouse will have many, imperfectly reliable but useful, expectations about it and its 'hidden' properties as gleaned from earlier encounters. She tells a similar story for re-identifiable individuals and stuffs and, deferring to Aristotle, calls them all 'substances' (cf. Millikan 1998, pp. 56-58) .
I have no doubt that this is broadly correct. But, in light of above discussion, we ought to be careful in jumping to the conclusion that generalisations over re-identifiable individuals requires that they be systematically represented or that concepts need to be, or ought to be, invoked to explain this capacity. This is especially pertinent given that Millikan, herself, recognises: Throughout the history of philosophy and psychology, the tendency has been to project into the mind itself the structure of the object grasp by thought. I will argue the contrary, namely that substances are grasped not by understanding the structures or principles that hold them together but by knowing how to exploit these substances for information gathering purposes. Knowing how to use a thing is not knowing facts about its structure (Millikan 1998, p. 58). This is a strong move against the prevailing intellectualist tradition, however this is also a move against her earlier comment about the need for concepts. For what is required to make Millikan's account of practical knowledge work is not an appeal to a set of basic concepts. All that is needed is an explanation of the capacities for re-identification and association. Connectionist networks are renown for their pattern recognition abilities and, to borrow from Andy Clark, they are associative engines par excellence (cf. Clark 1993b) .
In this context, he is wont to speak of 'prototype extraction and generalization'. For example, over time a net will respond to the statistically frequent features of items it encounters whilst 'training'. Moreover, these features become 'highly marked' and 'mutually associated ' (cf. Clark 1993b, p. 20) . To return to Millikan's example, mice will be 'reidentified' not because they share a set of essential, commonly identifiable features, but because they are prototypically similar. Moreover, if the network has uncovered some 'hidden properties' of mice, i.e. those not tied to how they appear, these will be mutually associated, and reinforced. Since there will be an increase in the excitatory links, or connections, between the manifest and hidden features the organism will have 'expectations' on subsequent encounters. These might be of use in providing it with a response pattern to the behaviour of mice. The point is that this kind of 'practical knowledge' can be underwritten by nothing more than the microcognitive architecture of connectionist networks (cf. Clark 1993b, p. 87).
Indeed, it is interesting that when appraising the abilities of connectionist systems Clark claims that there is "a definite limit to the good news. Several features of human cognition proved resistant to my basic treatment. In particular, I highlighted the difficulties of modelling structure-transforming generalizations in which knowledge is rapidly reorganized to deal with a new problem which is structurally related to one the organism has already solved." (Clark 1993 , p. 224, cf. also Clark 1993 . To account for this kind of abstract, structural thinking it would appear that context invariant, systematically recombinable symbols will be required. But, these are not needed in the great majority of cases of cognition involving practical knowledge.
The purpose of this section has been to demonstrate the important link between non-objective forms of nonconceptual content and the non-systematic character of PDP, connectionist processing. Indeed, thinkers such as Chrisley and Cussins have been at pains to point out that connectionist processing needs nonconceptual content (and vice versa ). They have returned volley on Fodor and Pylyshyn's (1995) assault on connectionist architectures by exposing their argument's implicit and unwarranted reliance on the idea that all content must be understood as conceptual (cf. Chrisley 1993 p. 323, 324, Cussins 1990 ). The point is that the kind of content most appropriate for PDP-processing is very likely a form of nonconceptual content that is both non-objective and non-systematic.
Biosemantic Theories of Content
To complete the natural circuit for this discussion it is not enough to rest easy with these observations about the happy union of connectionist vehicles of content with the appropriate type of nonconceptual content. Some attention must be given to the issue of 'correctness conditions'. Is it appropriate to speak in terms of 'correctness conditions' at all in the domain of non-objective, nonconceptual content? And, if so: What kind of correctness-conditions are appropriate for such content?
Bermúdez has suggested that "subpersonal information states [with nonconceptual content] lend themselves to a teleological theory of content" (Bermúdez 1995, p. 365) . Furthermore he claims that "Correctness conditions are fixed with reference to evolutionary design and past performance" (Bermúdez 1995, p. 366) . In this section, I want to take this proposal further by arguing that a modest biosemantics is the most appropriate version of the theory when it comes to understanding non-objective, nonconceptual content.
I begin by outlining some of the generic features of biosemantic theories of content. Biosemantical accounts rely on the normative character of the proper functions of mechanisms to underpin the kinds of correctness conditions required by a theory of content. The normativity flows from the historical pedigree of the mechanisms-not their current dispositions (cf. Millikan 1993, p. 160) . The very idea of a proper function, etiologically expounded, requires reference to 'normal conditions' of operation. Thus, even devices which rarely succeed in actually performing their proper function, can, nevertheless, have identifiable functions. For example, a liver that fails to successfully maintain blood-glucose levels still has the designated function of doing so. 4 Importantly, abnormality and dysfunction only make sense against a background understanding of proper functioning.
It is clear, however, that although all naturally selected biological mechanisms will have proper functions (in this sense), they are not all bearers of content. Following Millikan, the first place it is appropriate to speak of content is with respect to devices which she calls 'intentional icons ' (cf. Millikan 1984, ch. 6; 1993, ch. 5). 5 She is at pains to stress that such icons are inten t ional in Brentano's sense (not inten s ional) that they can be directed at features, objects or states of affairs which may or may not exist (cf. Millikan 1993, p. 109) . She also outlines several features that all inten t ional icons must have. The most important of which, for this discussion, are; (a) that they are supposed 'to map' unto the world by a rule of projection, (b) that they are produced by a mechanism whose function it is to bring about the mapping described in (a), and (c) that there is a consumer mechanism that may be guided by the icon in the performance of its proper function(s) (adapted from Millikan 1993, pp. 106-107) . 6 Using her paradigm example, the bee dance, we can see that one organism (in this case the dancing bee) is meant to produce an indicative intentional icon (its particular dance) which is used by the consumer organism (the watching bee) to generate an appropriate response (a patterned flight response which puts it in contact with nectar). 7 If all conditions for this type of characteristic dance are, evolutionary-speaking, normal then it will successfully map the location of nectar via a projection rule, thereby fulfilling its indicative function. Likewise, if all is normal then the characteristic response of the consumer mechanism will guide it to the nectar thereby fulfilling its imperative function (cf. Millikan 1984, p. 99) .
Although the example of co-operating mechanisms in the 'bee dance' case is one of two separate organisms, that is two different organisms, the account works just as easily within a single organism. Millikan writes:
Put (an analogue of) the bee dance inside the body so that it mediates between two parts of the same organism and you have… an inner representation (Millikan 1993, p. 164). Armed with this understanding of inten t ional icons, let us consider how Millikan's biosemantic account determines the correctness conditions of a intent ional icon with reference to the familiar case of the frog who indiscriminately shoots its tongue at a whole range of small, dark moving objects. On her account, in order to talk of the frog's mistake we must first determine the proper function of its internal mechanism. This provides the logical space for a normative assessment of misrepresentation. For 4 Millikan employs other examples to make the same point. She writes: "a diseased heart may not be capable of pumping, of functioning as a pump, although it is clearly its function, its biological purpose, to pump, and a mating display may fail to attract a mate although it is called a 'mating display' because its biological purpose is to attract a mate" (Millikan 1989b, p. 294) .
5 She borrows the term 'icon' from Peirce and does so, quite rightly, because it does not carry with it a legacy of confusion and disagreement.
her the way to understand its proper function is by appeal to "the most proximate Normal explanation for full proper performance" (Millikan 1984, p. 100, emphasis original). Millikan's stipulation leads us to favour the view that the function of the tongue-snapping behaviour is not to strike at a disjunctive set of small, dark moving objects; rather it is directed at flies and flies alone-since ingesting these served the ancestors of this kind of frog in their evolutionary development. 8 Hence, this version of biosemantics is first and foremost c oncerned with what ultimately benefited the organism.
Looking from the bottom up, Millikan's account has appeared explanatorily insufficient to some. Her critics suggest that if we concentrate wholly on what has actually benefited organisms as the basis for determining what an icon ought to 'represent' then we are in danger of counter-intuitively demanding too much of the representational capacities of these devices (Neander 1995 , pp. 126-129, Jacob 1997 . This is because such descriptions can be quite abstract and general. Neander illustrates the problem with the example of a male hoverfly. According to an exclusively benefit-based account, given his ultimate needs a male hoverfly "…misrepresents if he chases an infertile female or one who is soon to be the dinner of some passing bat" (Neander 1995, p. 127) . Likewise the frog 'misrepresents' if the fly it detects happens to be carrying a frog-killing virus or if it isn't in fact nutritious. Consequently, the correct description of proper function of such devices is to lead hoverflies to 'fertile mates' or enable frogs to get 'nutritious protein'. This in turn fixes their representational content at a higher level of grain than described earlier.
On this construal, the main issue is whether or not we can seriously credit organisms with the capacity to represent only that which is 'good for them'. This worry inspires Neander's proposal that when offering a biosemantic account we ought to look, as biologists do, at the "…lowest level at which the trait in question is an unanalysed component of the [proper] functional analysis" (Neander 1995, p. 129) . She reminds us that "…what counts as 'lowest' is relative to the trait in question" (Neander 1995: 129) . This last point is graphically illustrated by figure 2 (modified from Neander 1995, p. 125) .
Considering this diagram we might wonder: Which level, and its associated proper function, matters to inten t ional content? Neander's answer is that we should look to the lowest level on the grounds that this reflects sound biological practice. She writes that "…with respect to a given part (P) of an organism, biologists should (and do) give priority to that level of description which is most specific to P-the lowest level of description in the functional analysis before we go sub-P" (Neander 1995, p. 128) .
But this move is ill motivated. It is wholly consistent with Millikan's benefit-based account of the direct proper function of inten t ional icons that there exist logically stacked proper functions of the kind Neander describes. What her diagram reveals is simply that various higher level ends are served by the successful performance of the lower level devices or mechanisms. Organisms have devices (traits, responses, etc.) with different, multiple proper functions that are related to one another in a means-end fashion. The higher ends are served by the operation of mechanisms which can be functionally described in various ways depending on which end of the spectrum we wish to study. Rowlands recognises this kind of divide between higher and lower ends by insisting that we distinguish between "…two importantly distinct levels of func-8 She has expressed the same view to me privately in the following terms: "Connecting with something blackand -a -dot is no part of any proximate normal explanation of why any particular ancestor's helped it survive. Neither the blackness nor the dotness helped in any way, neither need be mentioned. But the nutritious object was essential" (Millikan 1996, private correspondence) . tional specification" which he respectively calls "…the organismic and the algorithmic levels of description" (Rowlands 1997, p. 288) . For example, in the case of the rattlesnake "…the organismic proper function of the mechanism is to enable the rattlesnake to detect eatability, but the algorithmic proper function of that mechanism is to detect warmth and movement" (Rowlands 1997, p. 291) . Likewise, Elder draws a distinction "…between what a representation-producing device is supposed to do, and how it is supposed to do it." (Elder 1998, p. 356) . Clearly, as Neander, Rowlands and Elder all note an organism's higher ends will only be served if the lower ends of its detector devices are served. That is to say an organism will only reap benefits by means of its lower order devices if things are functioning properly on all fronts. But this observation is nothing new. Compare the distinction between the highest (organismic) and lowest (algorithmic) level of proper functional description with Millikan's discussion of the various ways a bee dance can malfunction. She writes:
It is a function of the bee dance to lead the watching bees to the indicated nectar, even if it is poisoned . Prior to that, it is a function to lead them to a certain location, even if someone has taken the nectar away or replaced it with a trap . Suppose that a bee makes a mistake and dances a dance that's just wrong, either because it is not normal or because environmental conditions are not as required for its accurate functioning. In either case, a function of the dance is still to lead the watching bees to where the dance says the nectar is . (Millikan 1993, pp. 167 -168, emphases mine).
In this context, we can see the importance of Millikan's distinction between a device's direct proper function and its derived, adapted proper function. For example, a token bee dance will point the 'consumer' bee(s) towards the current, possibly unique, location of nectar. In this sense, it has the derived function to point thusly . But it only has this function in virtue of the fact that bee dances, as a class, have the stable direct proper function to send watching bees toward nectar. This is comparable to the way in which a photocopier has both the general proper function to copy 'that which is placed on the glass' and the supporting adapted, derived proper function to produce copies of the particular items placed on it . The point is that the function to point in particular direction is inherited from its direct proper function to get the consumer bee to nectar. This is why Millikan assigns predominance to a device's direct proper function when determining the content of an icon. It is also why she is able to ask, rhetorically: "Is it the heart's function to pump, or to pump blood? Both, I should think… And so with the magnetosome and the frog's detecting mechanisms." (Millikan 1991 , p. 160, cf. Jacob 1997 . Although these proper functions standardly complement one another nothing guarantees that they always do. Malfunctions can occur at various levels, for a number of reasons. But our concern is the intentionality of the complex responses, not the possibility of malfunction in the mechanisms that underlie them.
In light of what appears to be a general consensus, we can now return to the real question in this private war between biosemanticists: Which level, or which proper function, matters to inten t ional content? Recall that Neander's answer is that we should look to the lower level on the grounds that this reflects sound biological practice. But this encourages the question: Why is attention to the lowest level of description the focal point of sound biological practice? The answer is that the biologist is concerned with the lowest level of a mechanism's proper functions because it is at such a level that the explanation of a device's capacities can be 'discharged' in nonteleological terms. It is the hand over point for a different, Cummins-style, functional analysis. By focusing on the effects that mechanisms are, in fact, capable of producing when contributing to an overall system response, we are able to understand how such capacities can be ultimately broken down into purely physio-chemical (merely causal) processes. Rosenberg supplies some detailed examples of the way this kind of homuncular discharge takes place, "…at the border of molecular biology and organic chemistry" (Rosenberg 1985a, p. 59) . However despite bidding us to look low Rosenberg rightly recognises that attention to the lowest level is wholly consistent with the idea that at the higher level these mechanisms should be accorded functions with respect to their "evolutionary or adaptive pedigree" (Rosenberg 1985a, p. 59) . Thus he writes:
The function of the liver is to maintain blood-glucose levels because (1) the liver is capable of doing so , and (2) the body that contains it meets the needs to supply energy to the muscles, in part through the capacity of the liver. (Rosenberg 1985a, p. 58 , first and second emphasis mine).
Nothing in Millikan's benefit-based account of the direct proper function of inten t ional icons breaks faith with this. All Rosenberg's example shows is that various higher level ends are served by the successful performance of lower level devices. Looking at matters in this light reveals why there is no need to make a choice between high and low biosemantics.
If we accept that the various teleofunctional levels are complementary then, to return to Neander's example, it is surely the case that the correct selectionist explanation of a hoverfly's target is 'female hoverfly' while the frog's target is 'fly'. And we can address the concerns raised about perceptual capacities (cf. Elder 1998, p. 359) . Consider the frog. In the normal environment of their ancestors, it was the (perhaps rare) encounters with flies that accounted for the proliferation of their imperfect sensory systems. It was to flies that they responded when all was well and those responses were good enough, given their needs and their competition. Hence, it is to flies that their descendants ought to respond. And, ought implies can . In my view, the Neander objection is confused because the notion of a capacity is equivocal. Sometimes it is important to talk of greater and lesser capacities. However, in this case, it would be wrong to define the notion comparatively. Of course, it is true that frogs respond more frequently to 'small moving black dots' than to 'flies'. But this is no surprise since such responses are the means by which they are able to get flies at all. This would only be a worry if we were defining proper functions in statistical termswhich we are not. In the right conditions, frogs do have the capacity to target flies. What they lack is the capacity to discriminate flies and flies alone.
What then of the worry that taking the high road demands too much of the perceptual capacities of such creatures and assigns too much content to their icons? Why not say it is the more abstract end of the spectrum that defines the intentional object? Why say the frog is after 'flies' instead of 'nutritious things', or simply 'nutrition'? Once again, the answer concerns explanation. Given the competition, in the historical environment, the swallowing of 'flies' was good enough to get nutrition. If it wasn't the presumption is that frogs of this type would have adapted more precise sensory mechanisms to detect only the 'nutritious things' or they would have failed to proliferate. In either case, determining what was good enough for them to react to, and thereby fixing their target, cannot be done in a vacuum. Furthermore, taking the 'too high' road results in loss of explanatory purchase . If we travel too far in the direction of an abstract description of the organism's needs then every creature will be described as targeting the same things. For all creatures, great and small, success in the wild depends on appropriate responses to 'fertile mates', 'predators' and 'nutritious objects'. Despite this, not every creature in the same biologically niche are genuine competitors for the same resources, even though their targets fall under these general categories. The fly's potential mate is the frog's potential dinner. Creature needs are particular and, thus, must be distinguished more finely than the top-level description allows.
The Reply from on High
Neander is right to deploy the terminology of proper functions with respect to a device's lowest level of operation. It is true that such devices can malfunction in a way that demands a normative understanding. 9 For example, she notes that if we think of the frog as directed, not at flies, but at 'small dark, moving things' it is still possible for its responses to go awry. She writes:
A sick frog might R-token at a snail if it was dysfunctional in the right way. Damaging the frog's neurology, interfering in its embryological development, tinkering with its genes, giving it a virus, all of these could introduce malfunction and error. Therefore, the theory I am defending does not reduce content to the non-normative notion of indication or natural meaning. (Neander 1995 , p. 131, cf. Jacob 1997 .
Such is true even of the brain's, normally reliable, opioid receptors which are meant to interact with endorphin molecules . As Dennett notes "Both can be tricked-that is opened by an impostor. Morphine molecules are artifactual skeleton keys that 9 Interestingly Godfrey-Smith notes that "Although it is not always appreciated, the distinction between function and malfunction can be made within Cummins's framework… If a token of a component is not able to do whatever it is that other tokens do, that plays a distinguished role in the explanation of the capacities of the broader system, then that token is malfunctional." (Godfrey-Smith 1993, p. 200). have been fashioned to open the opioid-receptor doors too." (Dennett 1997, p. 47 ). As we have seen, recognition of this fact inspires view of content that locates it at the lowest possible teleofunctional level. Nevertheless, I'm afraid that Neander's proposed 'philosophical marriage of Fodor and Millikan' must end in divorce (cf. Neander 1995, p. 137) . Apart from being ill-motivated, there are serious problems in taking Neander's recommended low road when it comes to fixing intentional content.
First, Neander's account re-introduces the problem of distality which Millikan's version of biosemantics laid to rest. She notes this herself by telling us that low church biosemantics "…seems to drive us to proximal content… [for example,] it is, after all, by responding to a retinal pattern of a particular kind that the frog responds to small dark moving things" (Neander 1995, p. 136) . 10 This is not a trivial point: Low church biosemantics violates one of the minimal conditions for a device to count as an inten t ional icon. The mere fact that a biological device has a proper function and, hence, can malfunction is not sufficient to regard it as having a representational capacity. For if this was all that was required then all naturally selected biological devices would have content of some kind. Millikan shows this last claim to be fallacious when she describes the devices in chameleons that enable them to alter their skin coloration in relation to the background of their particular environments. Such devices have this capacity as a relational, derived adapted proper function, and as such they produce an appropriate 'mapping rule', but they lack a cooperating consumer device. For this reason, they cannot be regarded as inten t ional icons (Millikan 1993, p. 107) .
But, we must tread carefully in understanding why Neander's move is inadequate. Unlike the case of pigment adjusters in chameleons, the problem is not that there is no consumer-device for the retinal pattern. Nor is it that all icons must be necessarily directed at an external state of affairs in order to be intentional. It is true that biosemantics licenses the idea that the functions of organismic systems reach out into the external world. Millikan has no compunction in supporting a very broad vision of what inten t ional icons are directed at (cf. Millikan 1984, p. 100). Godfrey-Smith provides an illustrative example:
Sand scorpions detect prey by picking up combinations of mechanical waves in the sand… When an intruding biologist disturbs the ground with a ruler, and elicits a strike, the scorpion could be functioning normally, but the environment is abnormal. (Godfrey-Smith 1989, p. 546).
The point is that the scorpion's co-ordinated response is meant for a particular environment. This is in harmony with the idea that the behaviour of interest to the biopsychologist must be classified in "…accordance with [proper] function" which is defined with reference to a loop into such an environment (Millikan 1993, p. 135, 136) . Nonetheless, while talk of environments is important, the internal/external dichotomy is largely artificial. The only interesting difference between an internal and external environment, in the biosemantic context, is that the former tend to be homestatically regulated and, hence, more stable (cf. Millikan 1993, p. 161) .
If this is the case, then what, exactly, is wrong with the idea the frog is directed at certain characteristic patterns on its retina as opposed to flies? The problem is describing the function of the producerdevice only in terms of 'generating retinal patterns' or 'detecting black dots', as opposed to any of a number of proximal causal descriptions, does not explain why the response, and its underlying mechanisms, proliferated. Only mention of the distal object of concern, the 'final' cause,-be it internal or external-can do that. Therefore, it is the distal object that the organism ought to be directed at. Consider Millikan's distinction between a device's direct proper function and its derived, adapted proper function, once again. This distinction provides a means of clearly demarcating proximal and distal projection rules. She uses it in just this way when she describes hoverfly mating responses. Of the former, she writes:
Rather than turning toward the target in order to track it, the hoverfly turns away from the target and accelerates in a straight line so as to intercept it. Given that (1) female hoverflies are of uniform size, hence are first detected at a roughly uniform distance (about .7 m), (2) females cruise at a standard velocity (about 8m/sec), and (3) males accelerate at a constant rate (about 30 -35 m/sec from the target minus 1/10 of the vector angular velocity (measured in degrees per second) of the target's image across his retina… Taking note that this rule is not about how the hoverfly should behave in relation to distal objects but rather how he should react to a proximal stimulus, to a moving spot on his retina, let us call this rule 'the proximal hoverfly rule' (Millikan 1993, p. 219 ).
The point is that the lower-level, algorithmic projection rule (which is a product of the icon's derived, adapted proper function) enables us to understand how the hoverfly should respond to proximal stimuli. This is contrasted with the 'distal hoverfly rule' (which is a product of the icon's direct proper function). Millikan describes that rule as 'if you see a female catch it' (Millikan 1993, p. 222 ). The point is that if we are to speak of the content appropriate to an intentional icon we need to focus on the icon's direct proper function, or what Rowlands has called the organismic proper function.
A Modest Proposal
Having now defended Millikan's high church version of biosemantics from some recent criticisms, I want to encourage adoption of it in a modest form. Ambitious biosemantic accounts suffer because they attempt to unpack the notion of basic representation in terms of truth-evaluable content. 11 Consider these remarks of Papineau and McGinn.
The biological function of any given type of belief is to be present when a certain condition obtains: that then is the belief's truth condition (Papineau 1987, p. 64 I am unhappy with these remarks and Millikan's claim that biosemantic theory provides a 'non-vacuous' ground for a correspondence theory of truth. By such lights, all representations, whatever other features they exhibit, or fail to exhibit, have truthconditional content. While consideration of the scope of this claim may give us pause, the biosemanticist re-assures us that only humans really have beliefs with propositional content; lesser creatures have less sophisticated representations (i.e. protobeliefs, sub-doxastic states, etc.). Even so, these crude representations can still be true or false. Millikan's examples of simple organisms are specifically meant to "…make it clear how very local and minimal may be the mirroring of the environment is accomplished by an intentional icon" (Millikan 1993, p. 106 ). The thought is that such content enters into our natural history at a very early phase and becomes tied up with more and more complex cognitive dynamics as we travel up the phylogenetic tree and progress up the ontogenetic ladder. It is because we can describe systems of representation of graded complexity that we can explain the emergence of propositional content as a late development. For instance, we can mark the differences between creatures which are hard-wired for a particular environment from those which display plasticity (i.e. the ability to learn to cope with new environments). This point is crucial to note lest we be led astray by talk of bees and frogs into thinking that there are no differences between their forms of representation and ours.
Millikan lists six fundamental differences between human and animal representations which "…secure our superiority, [and] make us feel comfortably more endowed with mind" (Millikan 1989a, p. 297) . 13 The most important one on her list is the fact that we are able to make logical inferences by means of propositional content. Thus only representations of the kind which respect the law of 11 Godfrey-Smith usefully outlines the full spectrum of views from the pessimistic to the optimistic (GodfreySmith 1994b).
12 Papineau discusses the notion of truth more fully in his Philosophical Naturalism. Therein he tells us that he is attracted to a redundancy theory of truth which is backed up by a 'substantial theory of content ' (Papineau 1993, p. 85) . Unsurprisingly, he tells us that "The substantial theory of content I favour is in terms of success conditions and biological purposes" (Papineau 1993, p. 85) . 13 It is in this regard that Millikan responds to the rhetorical question "Is it really plausible that bacteria and paramecia, or even birds and bees, have inner representations in the same sense that we do? Am I really prepared to say that these creatures, too, have mental states, that they think? I am not prepared to say that" (Millikan 1989a, p. 294) . Dretske makes a similar point when he writes: "[t]o qualify as a belief a representational content must also exhibit (amongst other things) the familiar opacity characteristic of the propositional attitudes…" (Dretske 1986a, p. 27, emphasis mine).
non-contradiction can be deemed to have propositional content. In a nutshell, she holds that there are distinct types and levels of 'representation' and that not all 'representations' have the kind of content appropriate to full-fledged beliefs or desires. What this means is that biosemanticists need not, and should not, hold that content of the frog's intentional icon is captured by the conceptual content of the English sentence "There is an edible bug" or any other near equivalent. Millikan is explicit about this. With reference to bees she writes:
Bee dances, though (as I will argue) these are intentional items, do not contain denotative elements, because interpreter bees (presumably) do not identify the referents of these devices but merely react to them appropriately. (Millikan 1984, p. 71) .
What I take from this remark is that we 'identify' the object that the bee is directed at as 'nectar' using our own conceptual scheme. Indeed, we settle on this description because it is explanatorily relevant when giving a full, selectionist explanation of the proper function of bee dances. This much is incontestable. Moreover, due consideration of this fact reveals that although Fodor's critique concerning the indeterminacy of deciding on the right intensional description with respect to our selectionist explanations fails to undermine the biosemanticist project in the way he proposes, it is apposite to the extent that it highlights the fact that such descriptions are intensional in a way that the content of icons is not.
Any attempt to state the content of intentional icons in conceptual terms is an inappropriate attempt to deploy our own standard scheme of reference. But if one is willing to concede this then it is difficult to see what could motivate thinking of basic representations as having truth conditions. If icons lack intensional content then it is surely misguided to think of their mappings to the world in such terms. If we accept that they are not propositions, and that sense determines reference, we might ask: What is true? How can we have a truth relation if one of the crucial relata is absent. Hence, even if a modest version of biosemantics gives us a handle on the bivalent content of intentional icons it is a mistake to think of such content as truth-conditional. Minimally, to speak of truth requires that the subject in question has a capacity for propositional judgement. As Dummett notes, "In order to say anything illuminating about the concept of truth, then, we must link it with that of judgement or assertion." (Dummett 1993, p. 157) . How to understand the conditions that make talk and assessment of truth possible is a complicated business. Hence, Dummett makes the further claim that "A philosophical account of judgements lies, however, in their having a further significance than merely being right or wrong: they build up our picture of the world" (Dummett 1993, p. 157) . I discuss this issue in greater depth elsewhere (Hutto 1998 (Hutto , 1999 .
In contrast to truth-conditional versions of biosemantics, my alternative proposal is much more conservative. I suggest that organisms are informationally sensitive to objective features of their target objects in ways that enable them to engage with them successfully. Information sensitivity, as I am using the term, need not be understood in Dretskean form. It does not requires that there be unequivocal, perfect correlations between the source and receiver, although it is a move in this direction. We can take on board Neander's point that in some circumstances there might be malfunctions even at this level. Even in normal conditions, an organism's perceptual mechanisms will only be responsive only to certain features of things. Consider Akins' description of the phase-locked character of the FM neuron in the bat's auditory cortex. These neurons fire in response two auditory stimuli which, in the bats normal environment, are reliably co-varied with the beat of wings of certain type of insects. If we know that the creature is in such an environment then we can say the its neural response carries information about the beat of the insect's wing. Of course, to respond appropriately the bat does not, and does not need to, extract that information.
The big issue is not to determine what the bat is informationally sensitive to, but to determine what it is intentionally directed at. To understand intentionality aright, it will prove useful to revive its original, medieval image of "…aiming an arrow at something (intendere acrum in)…" (Dennett 1997: 48) . With this in mind, we can ask: Should we also say of the bat's neural response that is directed at the beat of the insect's wing? As we have seen, one reason to think so is because its perceptual or neural systems may appear to have this proper function. That its to say, we note that they might malfunction. But, as I have already argued, noting this is not sufficient for intentional ascription. Although responding to the wing beat of certain insects is part of the bat's co-ordinated response to its usual food source, we must remember that it this is only part of a coevolved package. Informational sensitivity to a certain feature or features is rarely an end itself for most creatures. In the bat's case, its FM neurons would not be responding thusly unless they competitively enabled the bat to get enough food. It does that by getting insects. Hence, it is insects that the bat and its conspecifics are directed at. They are the focus of its intentionality. Anything short of the whole insect will fail to meet the bat's minimal, nutritional needs. Hence, anything less will be insufficient to explain why the response proliferated. Conversely, bats are not directed at the protein the insect carries for a similar reason. In their home environment, targeting anything more refined than the insect is more than is required to meet their basic needs.
In summation, while organisms are informationally sensitive to certain features of the world they are not (usually) directed at those features. Rather they are directed at objects in the world which enable them to meet their basic needs. Their informationally sensitive perceptual systems provide the means of detecting, and thus competing, for what they require. This is illustrated by figure 3. Two organisms of the same kind, ∂ and ß, can be intentionally directed at the same type of object, X, because these objects provide a basic resource which they both require (e.g. nutrition). But how they detect Xs will vary if their, perceptual and neural mechanisms are informationally sensitive to different features of Xs, as genetic variation ensures. Of course, which features are better to be sensitive to depends on the context. And even this is never the whole story. The contest between the two organisms can be played out on other fronts as well. For example, although ∂ may be a poor hunter/gatherer, he may be a better lover. Nevertheless, even this crude rendering of the fight for survival is sufficient to enable us to draw the distinction between intentional direction and informational sensitivity.
A good way to make sense of this suggestion is to compare it with Akins' neurophysiological challenge to the traditional view of perception. Armstrong speaks for the tradition when he says "…[t]he senses inform us about what is going on in our environment (that is the evolutionary reason for their existence) and, sometimes deceive us" (Armstrong 1973, p. 27) . To make us reconsider this standard philosophical assumption, Akins describes the way in which our thermoreceptors respond to changes in temperature. She reports that "…our sensations are the result of the action of four different types of receptors: two thermoreceptors 'warm spots' and 'cold spots', and two pain receptors (nociceptors) that fire only in the extreme conditions of very high or very low temperature" (Akins 1996, p. 346) . Each thermoreceptor has a static as well as a dynamic function. The static function of both cold and warm spots is to respond to a constant temperature but they do so in different ways. For example, warm spots respond only to a narrow temperature range with an increase in activity as they reach the top of the range, then they quickly cease responding. In contrast, cold spots respond to a wider range of temperatures and their maximal response comes at the centre-point of this range. In light of this, Akins notes that "The static functions of neither the warm spots nor the cold spots are thermometer-like with a certain set increase in firing rate per degree of temperature change" (Akins 1996, p. 347). Things get even more complicated when we consider the dynamic functions of these thermoreceptors. Warm spots respond to temperature increases by increasing activity until they obtain a stable higher base rate, but the degree of activity varies in relation to the initial temperature. With respect to temperature decreases the rate of firing simply tampers off dropping from one plateau to another. The dynamic function of cold spots is the Having outlined the various mechanisms that underpin thermoreception, Akins then asks us to:
reconsider the old illusion created by placing one hand in cold water, the other in hot, and then, after a few minutes, placing both hands simultaneously in some tepid water. Stupid sensors. They tell you that the tepid water is two different temperatures. But the sensors seem less dull-witted if you think of them as telling you how a stimulus is affecting your skinthat one hand is rapidly cooling while the other is rapidly warming. Skin damage can occur from extremes of temperature (being burnt or frozen) but also from rapid temperature changes alone, even if the changes occur within the range for healthy skin (Akins 1996, p. 349). She concludes that "What the organism is worried about, in the best of narcissistic traditions, is its own comfort. the system is not asking 'What is it like out there?'-a question about the objective temperature states of the body's skin" (Akins 1996, p. 349) . Although thermoreception is but one case of sensory perception it is sufficient to cast doubt on the traditional view of the function of senses because it reveals that veridical representation would, in many cases, be evolutionarily excessive and expensive (cf. Clark 1989, p. 64) . This sits well with Stich's observation that "…natural selection does not care about truth; it cares about reproductive success" (Stich 1990d, p. 62). 14 In dropping the traditional assumption about the function of the senses, Akins' final analysis brings exactly the right level of sophistication to bear on the issue of how we should understand biologically directed responses. She writes:
Of course, it is true that, as a whole, an animal's behaviour must be directed toward certain salient objects or properties of its environment. Objects (and their properties) are important to the survival of all creatures. But from this fact alone, one cannot infer that the system of sensory encoding, used to produce that behaviour, uses a veridical encoding. That is, it does not follow from the fact that the owl's behaviour is directed toward the mouse or that the brain states bear systematic relations to stimuli, that there are any states of the owl's sensory system that are about or serve to detect the property of being a mouse (Akins 1996, p. 364). grounds, is incidental. Although I am sympathetic to the spirit of this proposal, I think it is wrongheaded. It must be asked: What is the value of thinking that organisms as having internal representations about creature-relative affordances? They drive us in the direction of odd representational contents as well as bizarre metaphysical entities.
Let us take the second complaint first. Affordances are, at best, explanatorily superfluous and metaphysically extravagant. If we consider figure 3 again, instead of simply talking in terms of organism ∂ and ß having different means of detecting a common object of concern, we must consider that if they have different discriminatory capacities they have different representations. But since these representations necessarily relate only to subjectivelyrelative properties, they will be representations of different 'things'. Even putting to one side the peculiar metaphysics this inspires, it is clearly obstructive to biological explanation since an orientation towards a common world is needed if organisms are to compete. This problem would need to be addressed if affordances were to be made viable. The cost of success would be a dramatic increase in our ontological economy. Every subtle difference in discriminatory capacity would need to be matched by a detectable creature-relative property. But, such labour and its attendant ontological overpopulation is unnecessary unless we are forced to introduce the notion in the first place. And as long we are not misled by a misleading philosophical picture into reifying representations, I can see no need to do so.
Furthermore, we must be wary the suggestion that we ought to positively designate the content of intentional icons in terms of a creature-relative concepts such as 'eatability'. Consider Elder's embarrassing attempt to provide such a designation in the case of the marina bacteria. He writes:
The bacteria have not a single thought about oxygen, and could not recognize it if it were right in front of them. So it is misleading to suggest that the content of a given tug is 'oxygen-free water thither'; it would be better to say, 'safe travel that-away' (Elder 1998, p. 360) .
Better, but not good enough. The problem with these awkward descriptions is that intentional icons simply do not have Fregean sense of any kind. In an important sense, they are not about anything, if aboutness requires us to say how the thing is thought about, even though they can be directed at things and features of things (cf. Dennett 1997, p. 49) . We must distinguish between having contentful thoughts about things and being merely directed at them.
For all these reasons, I am suspicious of the idea that the biological norms which underwrite the simplest form of representational content, i.e. intentionality, could be straightforwardly deployed in "…flat-footed correspondence views of representation and truth" (Millikan 1993, p. 12) . 16 Contra Millikan, I maintain that although creatures are normatively directed at features of the world the 'correctness conditions' which underpin this intentionality are not best understood as truth conditions. Biosemanticists should not assume that natural selection grounds veridical responses, even though the responses it produces may play a role in underpinning propositional judgements, which can be true or false.
In other words, the correctness conditions for the proper functioning of this type of response are nonobjective. However, given the discussion of the previous section of this paper, we need not regard this as an unsatisfactory result.
To return then to the original question, bearing this correctness criterion in mind, we may ask again: Do representations require reality? In one important sense, it seems they do not. For if we treat intentional icons as a species of representation then they are clearly non-objective in character. On the other hand, the lack of systematicity characteristic of such modes of thought fails to meet Millikan's requirement that full-blooded representations must be capable of use in mediate inferences. Also, they do not have the kind of opacity we expect of intensional contents. Therefore, it is not arbitrary to think that we can only properly speak of representations when there is a capacity for context-invariant, inferential cognition which relates to the objects and features of intersubjectively recognisable external world (cf. Hutto 1996 Hutto , 1998d Hutto , 1999b . So, in this light, the principled answer seems to be that representations do require reality. 16 Millikan tells us that it is "specifiable correspondence rules that give the semantics for the relevant system of representation… [and that a] certain correspondence between the representation and the world is what is normal" (Millikan 1989a, p. 287) . She also boldly says "I take myself to be defending the strongest possible kind of correspondence theory of truth and the most flat-footed interpretation of the truth-conditions approach to semantics" (Millikan 1993, p. 212) .
Epilogue: Consequences For Eliminativism
The arch-eliminativist Paul Churchland has long advocated an account of cognition which "…con-trasts sharply with the kinds of representational and processing strategies that analytic philosophers, cognitive psychologists, and AI workers have traditionally ascribed to us (namely, sentence-like representations…)." (Churchland 1989, pp. 130-131) . His rejection of orthodox accounts of 'representation' and sentential epistemologies is intimately linked to his attempt to eliminate 'folk psychological' categories of mind which incorporate such notions such as propositions, truth, and rationality. Nevertheless, as he writes, "I remain committed to the idea that there exists a world, independent of our cognition, with which we interact, and of which we construct representations" (Churchland 1989, p. 151) . In making these claims, he has been faced with the question: "Just what is the basic nature of 'representations' if they are so very different from those of the traditional 'sentential' sort?". The issue of representational content is important to Churchland because it is necessary to his overall eliminativist project that 'theories', with different contents, can be compared, contrasted and in some instances condemned (cf. Hutto 1993 Hutto , 1997 . Without some account of representational content eliminativism would be self-defeating. Eliminativists must be committed to the idea that 'theoretical content' exists. 17 Interestingly, Churchland has written as if such content is determined solely by external and social factors. For example, we see this when he discusses what is involved in the learning of a 'scientific truth'.
In school and university we are taught to recognise a panoply of complex prototypical situations-falling bodies, forces at equilibrium, oxidation, nuclear fission, the greenhouse effect, bacterial infection, etc.-and we are taught to anticipate the prototypical elements and effects of each. This is unquestionably a process of learning… But it is just as clearly a process of socialization, a process of adopting the conceptual machinery of an antecedent society… (Churchland 1989, p. 300, emphasis mine). This quotation of Churchland's seems to suggest that concept-learning is largely the adoption of an externally embodied intellectual tradition; that theoretical content is in an important sense inherited or given to us via a social environment. However, he has recently qualified this view by insisting that although "Institutionalized science certainly depends upon [public devices and techniques],… individual theorizing and explanatory understanding need not" (Churchlands 1996, p. 266) . Instead he insists that the right views to hold are "…that (a) speculative attempts to understand the world have their primary, original and still typical home within the brains of individual creatures and (b) an adequate account of that original activity must precede and sustain the secondary account of its subsequent flowering within the social matrix of the occasional social animals such as Homo Sapiens" (Churchlands 1996, p. 267).
The trouble is that he is quite clear that such 'activity' must be understood in terms of 'neural representations' which are, in some sense, supposed to be a species of conceptual network, albeit of a non-linguistic variety. This raises the issues about the kinds of content such 'neural representations' can allegedly sponsor. The issue needs clarification for, as Clark, writes "…the writings of [working connectionists and connectionist-inspired philosophers] are steeped in content-ascriptions of a relatively familiar kind. Thus we find talk of networks learning to recognise typical (and atypical contents for rooms (Rumelhart, Smolenksy, McClelland & 17 In order to properly understand the nature of conceptual change we need to know what concepts are being employed and what semantic value they carry, not primarily how, or even why, certain mechanisms are operating in the brain of the thinker. We can see the problem vividly if we consider Bechtel's criticism of the Churchland's account of large scale conceptual change. As he writes, such a phenomena occurs "in Churchland's connectionist framework, when a network gets trapped in a local minimum and must be bumped out of it by an infusion of noise that significantly alters the current weights in a network. With luck, the network will then be able to find a deeper minimum… While this account may characterise what occurs in the scientist as he or she undergoes large-scale conceptual change, it neither explains what causes the change (the sort of noise that will bump a network out of a local minimum) nor its rationality (especially since must bumps fail to lead to deeper minimums)." (Bechtel 1996, p. 123 ). If this is correct then concept learning simply cannot be reduced to a form of brain activity to be understood entirely in neuro-computational terms.
Hinton 1986), to distinguish rocks from mines (P. M. Churchland 1989, Chapter 9) , to group together animate objects (Elman 1989), etc., etc." (Clark 1996, p. 228) .
Given this we might wonder if Churchland is really operating with a radically different conception of content. For as we have seen, in the earlier sections of this paper, where classical cognitivist and connectionist accounts certainly differ is in the way they describe how content is processed. Hence, according to the traditional story the 'symbols' themselves are the entities involved in the computational transformations whereas the connectionist claims that computation occurs at the 'sub-symbolic' level (cf. Smolensky 1995, pp. 33-34) . On this characterisation of the classical cognitivist-connectionist debate the point of issue concerns the nature of processing-not the nature of content. For this reason, both classical cognitivists and connectionists alike must at some point face up to the problem of naturalising content. That is to say, as long as eliminativist connectionists still make use of the notion of representation they must be prepared to explain how is it that their connectionist units or aggregates of units, manage to represent. Put otherwise, we might wonder how we can determine the correctness conditions of a connectionist net's representations without appeal to normative features of its training, embodiment and/or environment.
The point is, as Cussins says, that "…the Churchlands and Paul Smolensky (1988) amongst others have explored accounts that appeal to representational vehicles such as connectionist vectors and vector-spaces, gradient descent through weight/ error space and partitions of activation-vector space. And Gareth Evans (1982 ), Christopher Peacocke (1989 , 1992a , 1992b and Adrian Cussins (1990 Cussins ( , 1992b amongst others have explored accounts of nonconceptual contents which are experiential modes of presentation whose structure is dependent upon how they are embodied in animals and embedded in the physical and social environment" (Cussins 1993, p. 241) . He concludes from this that "If eliminativism is ultimately to withstand the self-defeating charges… then it must combine theories of non-sentential vehicles with theories of non-conceptual contents…" (Cussins 1993, p. 241) .
There is evidence in Churchland's writings to suggest that he is willing to take this daring line. For example, he encourages us to "…look beyond such parochial virtues as Tarskian truth, since that is a feature unique to the parochial elements of human language, which is a peripheral medium of representation even for human cognition" (Churchland 1989, p. 301) . 18 Elsewhere, he has cast his revisionist project as being "…in pursuit of some epistemic goal even more worthy than truth" (Paul Churchland 1989, p. 150) .
I agree with Cussins that Churchland's problem is that he has concentrated far too much on giving alternative accounts of the vehicle of content, by advancing proposals about state space semantics, and not enough on developing successor proposals about the nature of the content itself. It might appear that because connectionism offers a new means of understanding the mechanics of cognition it thereby offers an alternative theory of content; but this does not follow.
On the other hand, I do not believe that an endorsement of nonconceptual content alone is enough to rescue the epistemological requirements of eliminativism. If the arguments of the previous sections of this paper are in order, then the kind of nonconceptual content most appropriate for connectionist processing, is a form of non-systematic, non-objective and non-truth-evaulable content. It is not properly speaking representational because it does not map unto objective features of the world. Thus, if Churchland were to adopt the Cussins strategy it would undermine rather than rescue eliminativism.
If the eliminativists treat nonconceptual content as a form of non-objective content, then it cannot underwrite or explain full-blown 'theoretical content' of the familiar kind by any 'direct' means. For this reason, such a manoeuvre cannot secure the epistemological basis of eliminativism. The catch of endorsing such a view of content is that it cannot protect eliminativism from the charge of advancing a self-defeating account.
In clarifying his position, Churchland faces a fatal choice. Either he must endorse a traditional line making his views far less radical than they were originally advertised to be. Or, he must deny tradition altogether but lack the resources required to explain the nature of 'representations' per se. In the end, I believe that he ought to forgo his extreme eliminativism, and accept a more limited application of his work on the nature of what might be called non-representational cognition.
In the end, I question whether eliminativists can deal adequately with the kind of representational content required to ground their epistemology. Ironically, it is worth emphasising, in this regard, that Churchland has been wont to say of some of his opponents that "There need be nothing inauthentic about declining eliminative materialism… if one declines the [coherentist] epistemology that makes it possible" (Paul Churchland 1993, p. 212) . I want to claim that it is precisely by accepting a broadly coherentist epistemology that we must reject eliminativist materialism. For it is with respect to coherentism that we must conclude that it is extreme materialism that is lacking (cf. Nagel 1986). It turns out that there are good reasons to maintain a commitment to some form of conceptual, representational content. If such content cannot be incorporated into a restricted naturalised metaphysics then that metaphysics needs to be reconsidered. This is not a possibility that the Churchlands permit themselves to entertain. It is true that because some philosophers simply assume without further ado that conceptual content is ineliminable that "…'bad faith' or 'inauthenticity'… dominates current discussions of Eliminative Materialism" (Paul Churchland 1993, p. 211). Nonetheless, a similar 'bad faith' infects the eliminativist position in so far as they assume that their extreme materialism is beyond question. But materialism can and should be questioned (cf. Hutto 1992a (cf. Hutto , 1992b (cf. Hutto , 1993 (cf. Hutto , 1998a (cf. Hutto , 1998b (cf. Hutto , 1998c (cf. Hutto , 1999 . Steeling ourselves to think in this way may be the prelude to our taking the first steps in developing a proper account of the phylogenetic and ontogenetic basis of genuinely representational cognition.
